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Research note · Device identifiers

The Windows GDID, measured

This note explains what Microsoft's device identifier is, using the court record and Microsoft's own documentation, and reports what six of my lab machines actually store. It's for security and privacy readers, and you'll leave knowing that each machine holds its own server-assigned ID, kept per security context, and that independent researchers report there is no supported way to turn it off.

Short version

Every Windows installation that has ever reached login.live.com holds a 64-bit identifier issued by Microsoft's servers. Microsoft calls it the Global Device Identifier (GDID). It survives updates, changes on reinstall, and lets Microsoft join a device's activity across its services. Windows caches it in the registry, one value per security context, and there is no supported way to turn it off.

We read it from six machines in our lab: five Active Directory servers that were believed to be isolated, and one workstation. Every machine had at least one. No two values matched. The values fall into a handful of server-side allocation pools that cut across machines and across a single machine's own accounts. The identifier is assigned, not derived.

What the court record says verified

The only public Microsoft characterization is a representative quoted in the affidavit supporting the superseding complaint in United States v. Peter Stokes, No. 25 CR 812 (N.D. Ill.), sworn 16 April 2026 and unsealed 30 June 2026.

"A Global Device Identifier in the Windows ecosystem is a persistent, device-level identifier designed to uniquely identify an installation of a Windows operating system on a device, either a physical device (e.g., a mobile phone or laptop) or virtual machine, across certain Microsoft services and scenarios. … A GDID remains consistent across Windows operating system updates on a device, but a reinstall of Windows, either on the same device or on a different device, will be tied to a new unique GDID." Affidavit, ¶25. The ngrok account in the case was "set up through Global Device Identifier g:6755467234350028."
Format
g:6755467234350028

A 64-bit value shown in decimal, stored in the registry as 16 hex digits. Not a GUID.

Microsoft documentation

GlobalDeviceId appears in the Azure Monitor UCDOStatus table ("used by Microsoft internally") and as globalDeviceId: "g:value" in the Managed Desktop API. An Intune article ties the "global device ID" to the Microsoft Account Sign-in Assistant service (wlidsvc).

What Microsoft provided

URL-level browsing records keyed to the GDID, its IP history including VPN exits, and IPs that matched other accounts. The legal instrument for those records is not stated; a "reverse" § 2703(d) order for two IP addresses is (fn. 9).

Not from Microsoft

The registry path, the 0018 prefix, the service chain and the "cannot be disabled" claim come from independent reverse engineering. They are findings, not documentation. Our reads are consistent with them.

How a machine gets one

The identity stack asks Microsoft for a device ticket the first time a security context needs one. The reply carries the identifier. Nothing on the machine computes it.

wlidsvc MSA Sign-in Assistant trigger-start, per context login.live.com Microsoft identity service assigns a device PUID Registry cache HKU\<sid>\...\IdentityCRL\ ExtendedProperties\LID Reported onward Windows Update DCAT, Delivery Optimization, CDP (dds) Microsoft records keyed by GDID ticket request PUID One request per security context: SYSTEM, LocalService, NetworkService, each user, each packaged-app container. No outbound path to login.live.com = no identifier. Delete the cached value and it is fetched again.

Scroll sideways to see the whole figure.

What six machines hold verified

Five Windows Server hosts in our lab (three domain controllers across two forests, two member servers) were read as SYSTEM through the hypervisor's guest agent, plus one Windows 11 25H2 workstation. Every loaded registry hive carries its own value. Color is the high 32 bits of the value, which behaves like an allocation pool on Microsoft's side. Low 32 bits are masked here; they are unique per value and add nothing to the argument.

SYSTEM / .DEFAULT
LocalService
NetworkService
Domain user
Local user / other
DC-1forest A root
00184018…
0018C017…
0018C017…
0018C017…forest A user
not loaded
DC-2forest A child domain
00188018…
00188018…
00188018…
00188018…child-domain user X
not loaded
DC-3forest B root
0018C017…
00180019…
not loaded
00180019…forest B user
not loaded
SRV-1member, forest A child
00188018…
00188018…
00184018…
0018C017…child-domain user X
00180019…local account
SRV-2member, forest B
00188018…
00180019…
not loaded
00188018…forest B user
not loaded
WorkstationWin 11 25H2, standalone
not read
not read
not read
00188018…Microsoft account user
0018C015…AAD BrokerPlugin container
00184018 0018C017 00180019 00188018 0018C015 Dashed: hive not loaded at read time, or not read.

Scroll sideways to see all five contexts.

Machines
6 / 6

hold at least one identifier: five servers believed to be isolated, one workstation.

Shared values
0

No two machines and no two security contexts hold the same value. Servers cloned from shared templates did not inherit one.

Pools
5

Five high-32-bit blocks across 21 values. One pool shows up on different machines and on different accounts of one machine.

Prefix
0018

Every value starts with the device-class marker that reverse engineering predicted. Independent confirmation from our own machines.

Reading the grid

The same domain account (child-domain user X) logged on to DC-2 and SRV-1 and got two different identifiers from two different pools. SRV-1 alone holds values from four pools across five contexts. Three servers drew their SYSTEM-context values from pool 00188018, the same pool the workstation's user-profile value came from. A hardware-derived identifier would be constant across a machine's contexts and unique to the machine. This is the opposite on both counts.

The affidavit's "a GDID" per installation simplifies what a machine actually caches. hypothesis The SYSTEM-context value is the one Windows Update's DCAT service sends and the one Microsoft would call the GDID; the others are device-scoped tickets for each account and app container.

The workstation

A signed-in Windows 11 25H2 workstation. Two identifiers, two pools, no directory registration of any kind.

ContextPoolWhat it is
User profile (Microsoft account)00188018…The OS/MSA device identifier. Twelve app token entries reuse it.
Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin0018C015…The Web Account Manager broker's own container ticket. MSA-side, not an Entra device ID.
Entra / domain / workplace—dsregcmd /status: AzureAdJoined NO, DomainJoined NO, WorkplaceJoined NO.

Same pool as three servers' SYSTEM contexts. The only party that can join these two values to each other, or to anything else, is Microsoft.

What it means

For lab isolation

The identifiers cannot exist without a completed exchange with login.live.com. Our lab router NATs to the internet. The lab was isolated from our other networks, not from Microsoft. Any activity on these hosts that a Microsoft service logs is keyed to these values.

The fix is an egress block at the lab router: login.live.com, *.dds.microsoft.com, *.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com, licensing.mp.microsoft.com and activity.windows.com. Cost: feature-update offers and Microsoft-account sign-in stop. A lab rarely needs either.

wlidsvc was Stopped / Manual on all five servers. It trigger-starts, so it has run at least once per context and will again.

For incident response

This is a provider-side correlation key. Only Microsoft can query the records it indexes, and only under legal process. It is not a local forensic artifact to build a case on: a reinstall produces a new value, so it cannot link a machine across wipes. For host correlation, use MachineGuid, SIDs and Elastic host.id.

For legal process

Read ¶25–29 and footnote 9 of the affidavit verbatim. The "reverse" § 2703(d) order (non-content records, "specific and articulable facts," applied to IP addresses rather than an account) is the notable instrument. Contrast it with the content warrants for Snapchat, Apple and Facebook. The instrument that produced the GDID records is not disclosed.

Read it yourself

Your own context, no elevation. Windows 10 and 11; Server 2022 confirmed above.

$hex = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).LID
if ($hex) { "LID=$hex  g:$([Convert]::ToUInt64($hex,16))" } else { "no LID in HKCU" }

Every loaded hive, elevated. This produced the grid above.

Get-ChildItem Registry::HKEY_USERS | ForEach-Object {
  $lid = (Get-ItemProperty ("Registry::" + $_.Name + "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties") -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).LID
  if ($lid) { "{0}  LID={1}  g:{2}" -f $_.PSChildName, $lid, [Convert]::ToUInt64($lid,16) }
}
Get-Service wlidsvc | Select-Object Status, StartType

Which app owns an AppContainer entry under IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token:

Get-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Mappings\<S-1-15-2-...>" | Select-Object Moniker, DisplayName

Limits: only loaded hives are read. A profile that is not logged on needs its NTUSER.DAT loaded with reg load. The registry path is where researchers found the cache, not a documented location, so an empty result means "nothing cached here," not "no identifier."

Verified, hypothesis, open

Terms

GDIDGlobal Device Identifier. Microsoft's name, per the affidavit, for the per-installation device identifier.
PUIDPassport Unique ID. Microsoft-account-era name for an identity-service identifier; device PUIDs are what the registry caches.
LIDThe registry value name that holds the cached PUID, in hex.
MSAMicrosoft account (consumer identity, login.live.com).
wlidsvcMicrosoft Account Sign-in Assistant, the Windows service that requests device tickets.
WAM / AAD BrokerPluginWeb Account Manager and its broker app, which handles token requests for apps.
Entra (AAD)Microsoft Entra ID, formerly Azure Active Directory; the work/school directory.
DCATThe Windows Update content service that, per independent research, reports the identifier.
DODelivery Optimization, Windows' peer-assisted update download service.
CDPConnected Devices Platform; its device directory service is dds.
HKUHKEY_USERS, where each loaded profile's hive is mounted by SID.
SIDSecurity identifier for an account or service context (e.g. S-1-5-19 LocalService, S-1-5-20 NetworkService).
DC / SRVDomain controller / member server, as labeled in the grid.
NATNetwork address translation; here, the lab router's path to the internet.
MachineGuidA locally generated per-install GUID under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography.
§ 2703(d)18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), a court order for non-content provider records on "specific and articulable facts."

Sources

  1. Superseding criminal complaint and affidavit, United States v. Peter Stokes, No. 25 CR 812 (N.D. Ill.), sworn 16 Apr 2026. U.S. Department of Justice: complaint (PDF); press release 1 Jul 2026.
  2. Microsoft Learn: Azure Monitor table UCDOStatus (GlobalDeviceId); Managed Desktop API, list devices; Intune troubleshooting, feature updates never offered.
  3. Independent reverse engineering: gdid-reversal (GitHub); Windscribe, deGDID; IT-Connect, GDID impossible to delete.
  4. Reporting: ghacks, 12 Jul 2026; Windows Latest, 10 Jul 2026; The Register, 7 Jul 2026; iTnews.
  5. Lab reads: Brown Cyber Services, 10 Oct 2026.

Corrections and additions: contact@browncyber.com.