Short version
Every Windows installation that has ever reached login.live.com holds a 64-bit identifier issued by Microsoft's servers. Microsoft calls it the Global Device Identifier (GDID). It survives updates, changes on reinstall, and lets Microsoft join a device's activity across its services. Windows caches it in the registry, one value per security context, and there is no supported way to turn it off.
We read it from six machines in our lab: five Active Directory servers that were believed to be isolated, and one workstation. Every machine had at least one. No two values matched. The values fall into a handful of server-side allocation pools that cut across machines and across a single machine's own accounts. The identifier is assigned, not derived.
What the court record says verified
The only public Microsoft characterization is a representative quoted in the affidavit supporting the superseding complaint in United States v. Peter Stokes, No. 25 CR 812 (N.D. Ill.), sworn 16 April 2026 and unsealed 30 June 2026.
"A Global Device Identifier in the Windows ecosystem is a persistent, device-level identifier designed to uniquely identify an installation of a Windows operating system on a device, either a physical device (e.g., a mobile phone or laptop) or virtual machine, across certain Microsoft services and scenarios. … A GDID remains consistent across Windows operating system updates on a device, but a reinstall of Windows, either on the same device or on a different device, will be tied to a new unique GDID." Affidavit, ¶25. The ngrok account in the case was "set up through Global Device Identifier g:6755467234350028."
A 64-bit value shown in decimal, stored in the registry as 16 hex digits. Not a GUID.
GlobalDeviceId appears in the Azure Monitor UCDOStatus table ("used by Microsoft internally") and as globalDeviceId: "g:value" in the Managed Desktop API. An Intune article ties the "global device ID" to the Microsoft Account Sign-in Assistant service (wlidsvc).
URL-level browsing records keyed to the GDID, its IP history including VPN exits, and IPs that matched other accounts. The legal instrument for those records is not stated; a "reverse" § 2703(d) order for two IP addresses is (fn. 9).
The registry path, the 0018 prefix, the service chain and the "cannot be disabled" claim come from independent reverse engineering. They are findings, not documentation. Our reads are consistent with them.
How a machine gets one
The identity stack asks Microsoft for a device ticket the first time a security context needs one. The reply carries the identifier. Nothing on the machine computes it.
Scroll sideways to see the whole figure.
What six machines hold verified
Five Windows Server hosts in our lab (three domain controllers across two forests, two member servers) were read as SYSTEM through the hypervisor's guest agent, plus one Windows 11 25H2 workstation. Every loaded registry hive carries its own value. Color is the high 32 bits of the value, which behaves like an allocation pool on Microsoft's side. Low 32 bits are masked here; they are unique per value and add nothing to the argument.
Scroll sideways to see all five contexts.
hold at least one identifier: five servers believed to be isolated, one workstation.
No two machines and no two security contexts hold the same value. Servers cloned from shared templates did not inherit one.
Five high-32-bit blocks across 21 values. One pool shows up on different machines and on different accounts of one machine.
Every value starts with the device-class marker that reverse engineering predicted. Independent confirmation from our own machines.
Reading the grid
The same domain account (child-domain user X) logged on to DC-2 and SRV-1 and got two different identifiers from two different pools. SRV-1 alone holds values from four pools across five contexts. Three servers drew their SYSTEM-context values from pool 00188018, the same pool the workstation's user-profile value came from. A hardware-derived identifier would be constant across a machine's contexts and unique to the machine. This is the opposite on both counts.
The affidavit's "a GDID" per installation simplifies what a machine actually caches. hypothesis The SYSTEM-context value is the one Windows Update's DCAT service sends and the one Microsoft would call the GDID; the others are device-scoped tickets for each account and app container.
The workstation
A signed-in Windows 11 25H2 workstation. Two identifiers, two pools, no directory registration of any kind.
| Context | Pool | What it is |
|---|---|---|
| User profile (Microsoft account) | 00188018… | The OS/MSA device identifier. Twelve app token entries reuse it. |
| Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin | 0018C015… | The Web Account Manager broker's own container ticket. MSA-side, not an Entra device ID. |
| Entra / domain / workplace | — | dsregcmd /status: AzureAdJoined NO, DomainJoined NO, WorkplaceJoined NO. |
Same pool as three servers' SYSTEM contexts. The only party that can join these two values to each other, or to anything else, is Microsoft.
What it means
For lab isolation
The identifiers cannot exist without a completed exchange with login.live.com. Our lab router NATs to the internet. The lab was isolated from our other networks, not from Microsoft. Any activity on these hosts that a Microsoft service logs is keyed to these values.
The fix is an egress block at the lab router: login.live.com, *.dds.microsoft.com, *.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com, licensing.mp.microsoft.com and activity.windows.com. Cost: feature-update offers and Microsoft-account sign-in stop. A lab rarely needs either.
wlidsvc was Stopped / Manual on all five servers. It trigger-starts, so it has run at least once per context and will again.
For incident response
This is a provider-side correlation key. Only Microsoft can query the records it indexes, and only under legal process. It is not a local forensic artifact to build a case on: a reinstall produces a new value, so it cannot link a machine across wipes. For host correlation, use MachineGuid, SIDs and Elastic host.id.
For legal process
Read ¶25–29 and footnote 9 of the affidavit verbatim. The "reverse" § 2703(d) order (non-content records, "specific and articulable facts," applied to IP addresses rather than an account) is the notable instrument. Contrast it with the content warrants for Snapchat, Apple and Facebook. The instrument that produced the GDID records is not disclosed.
Read it yourself
Your own context, no elevation. Windows 10 and 11; Server 2022 confirmed above.
$hex = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).LID
if ($hex) { "LID=$hex g:$([Convert]::ToUInt64($hex,16))" } else { "no LID in HKCU" }
Every loaded hive, elevated. This produced the grid above.
Get-ChildItem Registry::HKEY_USERS | ForEach-Object {
$lid = (Get-ItemProperty ("Registry::" + $_.Name + "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties") -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).LID
if ($lid) { "{0} LID={1} g:{2}" -f $_.PSChildName, $lid, [Convert]::ToUInt64($lid,16) }
}
Get-Service wlidsvc | Select-Object Status, StartType
Which app owns an AppContainer entry under IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token:
Get-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Mappings\<S-1-15-2-...>" | Select-Object Moniker, DisplayName
Limits: only loaded hives are read. A profile that is not logged on needs its NTUSER.DAT loaded with reg load. The registry path is where researchers found the cache, not a documented location, so an empty result means "nothing cached here," not "no identifier."
Verified, hypothesis, open
- verifiedThe identifier exists; its format, update and reinstall behavior, and Microsoft's description. Source: the Stokes affidavit and Microsoft Learn.
- verifiedAll five lab servers and the workstation hold values at the researched registry path; none shared; five pools;
0018prefix throughout. Source: our reads, 10 Oct 2026. - verifiedThe workstation has no Entra, domain or workplace registration. Source:
dsregcmd /status. - hypothesisThe SYSTEM-context value is "the" GDID Microsoft means; the high 32 bits are a server-side allocation pool.
- hypothesisThe server templates never held a value, or re-minted after clone. Either way, no shared value exists today.
- not from MicrosoftRegistry path, service chain, "cannot be disabled," and the deGDID and spoofer tools. Independent research only; the first two match what we observed.
- openWhen each context minted its value (registry key LastWriteTime not yet read). Whether Microsoft links the broker's value to any directory record.
Terms
| GDID | Global Device Identifier. Microsoft's name, per the affidavit, for the per-installation device identifier. |
| PUID | Passport Unique ID. Microsoft-account-era name for an identity-service identifier; device PUIDs are what the registry caches. |
| LID | The registry value name that holds the cached PUID, in hex. |
| MSA | Microsoft account (consumer identity, login.live.com). |
| wlidsvc | Microsoft Account Sign-in Assistant, the Windows service that requests device tickets. |
| WAM / AAD BrokerPlugin | Web Account Manager and its broker app, which handles token requests for apps. |
| Entra (AAD) | Microsoft Entra ID, formerly Azure Active Directory; the work/school directory. |
| DCAT | The Windows Update content service that, per independent research, reports the identifier. |
| DO | Delivery Optimization, Windows' peer-assisted update download service. |
| CDP | Connected Devices Platform; its device directory service is dds. |
| HKU | HKEY_USERS, where each loaded profile's hive is mounted by SID. |
| SID | Security identifier for an account or service context (e.g. S-1-5-19 LocalService, S-1-5-20 NetworkService). |
| DC / SRV | Domain controller / member server, as labeled in the grid. |
| NAT | Network address translation; here, the lab router's path to the internet. |
| MachineGuid | A locally generated per-install GUID under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography. |
| § 2703(d) | 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), a court order for non-content provider records on "specific and articulable facts." |
Sources
- Superseding criminal complaint and affidavit, United States v. Peter Stokes, No. 25 CR 812 (N.D. Ill.), sworn 16 Apr 2026. U.S. Department of Justice: complaint (PDF); press release 1 Jul 2026.
- Microsoft Learn: Azure Monitor table UCDOStatus (
GlobalDeviceId); Managed Desktop API, list devices; Intune troubleshooting, feature updates never offered. - Independent reverse engineering: gdid-reversal (GitHub); Windscribe, deGDID; IT-Connect, GDID impossible to delete.
- Reporting: ghacks, 12 Jul 2026; Windows Latest, 10 Jul 2026; The Register, 7 Jul 2026; iTnews.
- Lab reads: Brown Cyber Services, 10 Oct 2026.
Corrections and additions: contact@browncyber.com.